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Abstract 
 
Recent literature finds that exporters are particularly vulnerable to financial market frictions. 
As a consequence, exports may be lower than their efficient levels. For this reason, 
many countries support exporters by underwriting export credit guarantees. The empirical 
evidence on the effects of those policies is, however, very limited. In this paper, we use 
sectoral data on export credit guarantees issued by the German government. We investigate 
whether those guarantees indeed do increase exports, and whether they remedy the export-
restricting effect of credit market imperfections both on the sectoral and on the export 
market levels. Exploiting the sectoral structure of a rich three-ways panel data set of 
German exports, we control for unobserved heterogeneity on the country-year, sector-
year, and country-sector dimensions. We document a robust export-increasing effect of 
guarantees. There is some evidence that the effect is larger for export markets with poor 
financial institutions and in sectors that rely more on external finance. 
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assistance.  1 Introduction
According to Auboin (2009), some 80-90 percent of all exporters rely on trade ﬁnance. Fi-
nancial frictions can therefore have a potentially disruptive role for international trade ﬂows.
A recent surge of theoretical and empirical papers study the role of ﬁnancial frictions for the
export performance of ﬁrms. The emerging picture suggests that credit market imperfections
do restrain exports, in particular in sectors where ﬁrms rely strongly on external ﬁnance
(Manova et al., 2011). It follows that countries with adequate ﬁnancial institutions enjoy a
comparative advantage in ﬁnancially vulnerable areas of activity (Beck, 2002). The collapse
of credit markets in the crisis of 2008-09 has hit exporters harder than other ﬁrms, explaining
why international trade fell much more strongly than GDP (Chor and Manova, 2011).1
Even in the absence of ﬁnancial crises, many countries insure their exporters against
default risk of their foreign customers. Under current WTO norms, “the provision by gov-
ernments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantee or
insurance programmes”2 qualify as export subsidies and would, in principle, be outlawed.
However, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures exempts those
schemes if a suﬃciently large number of GATT members (12) are members of an “interna-
tional undertaking on oﬃcial export credits” that regulates the use of those guarantees. The
eﬃciency rationale for this export credit guarantees provided by governments is that private
ﬁnancial markets do not oﬀer adequate instruments to cover export credit risks.
In this paper we use data on the oﬃcial German export credit guarantee scheme. That
scheme is administered on behalf of the German government by Euler Hermes, a private
consortium.3 The case of Germany is interesting because Germany is the world’s second
largest exporter (and was the ﬁrst in some years in our sample) and because Euler Hermes is
the second largest player in the market for government issued export credit guarantees, after
the USA.4 Euler Hermes has provided us with the universe of all credit guarantee transactions
extended to German exporters in the period 2000 to 2009. These data provide details about
1Alternative explanations of the strong collapse of trade have been oﬀered by Eaton et al. (2011) and Yi
(2009), amongst others. Eaton et al. argue that the drop in trade has been caused by an overproportional
fall in demand for traded goods and not so much by increased costs of external ﬁnance. Yi stresses the
implications of an increasingly vertically integrated global value chain for the elasticity of trade to GDP.
2WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex I, articles j and k.
3The consortium consists of PriceWaterhouseCoopers-AG and the Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG.
In the remainder of this paper we refer to the consortium as to Euler Hermes. For an excellent overview on
how Euler Hermes works, see Moser et al. (2008).
4See Berne Union (2011), the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers that includes oﬃcial
export credit agencies and also private insurers.
1the quantity of coverage and the insurance type granted to each ﬁrm, by export destination
and industry. Other ﬁrm-level information such as ﬁrms’ exports or sales volumes is not
available. Names and locations of ﬁrms are known, but it is impossible to match those ﬁrms
with ﬁrm-level information on exports. In principle, it is possible to match the Euler Hermes
data to commercial ﬁrm-level data sets such as Amadeus; however, one would lose the export
market information.5 Variation across export markets (destinations  sectors) is the central
source of identiﬁcation in the present paper, so that we use the Euler Hermes data together
with oﬃcial sectoral export data for Germany.
We report the following main ﬁndings. First, public export credit guarantees increase
sectoral exports. An increase in the level of guarantees by one percent increases exports by
0.012 to 0.017 percent. This point estimate hides the fact that only about 2-3 percent of
German export markets (destination  industry cells) and approximately the same share
of aggregate trade volume are covered by guarantees. Compared to Moser et al.’s (2008)
random eﬀects exercise, our estimate is only half as big. It follows that controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity, which aﬀects both the incidence of guarantees and export volumes,
is crucial. Second, we show that export creation is strongly concentrated in certain sectors
and destinations. This is compatible with the view that variation in ﬁnancial vulnerability
across sectors and variation in the quality of ﬁnancial institutions across destinations matters
for the eﬀect. Third, the export enhancing eﬀect of public guarantees was largest in the year
2008, when the international ﬁnancial crisis reached its peak. Fourth, the quality of ﬁnancial
institutions in destination countries aﬀects exports positively; the interaction with public
German guarantees is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, we have only weak
evidence that guarantees are more important when destination country frictions are strong.
Finally, we report some evidence that guarantees have helped reduce the drop in exports
due to the ﬁnancial crisis in sectors that are particularly dependent on external ﬁnance. The
eﬀect does, however, not appear to work primarily through trade credit.
Related Literature
Our paper is most intimately related to two studies that test for the eﬀects of public export
credit insurance schemes. The only paper on the German export credit guarantees is by
Moser et al. (2008). Our approach diﬀers from theirs in several ways. The ﬁrst diﬀerence
relates to data: Our analysis covers the period 2000-2009 while theirs covers 1992-2003; we
work with data on the 2-digits industry level while they use aggregate data. The second
5In related research, we use the merge between the Euler Hermes data and the Amadeus-Hoppenstedt
data base for Germany.
2diﬀerence concerns econometric methodology: We ﬁnd that the Hausman test forces us to
use ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation; Moser et al. (2008) use random eﬀects models. The additional
industry dimension allows us to include country  year (sector) eﬀects into the analysis to
account for multilateral resistance terms. Moreover, we adopt a more conservative way to
compute standard errors (acknowledging serial dependence of errors). The third diﬀerence
rests on the focus of the analysis: We are not so much interested in estimating a dynamic
gravity equation. Rather, we try to analyze whether the public export credit insurance
scheme has indeed alleviated ﬁnancial frictions. Egger and Url (2006) have studied export
credit guarantees by the Austrian Kontrollbank. They estimate elasticities of exports with
respect to guarantees that are three to ﬁve times larger than those found by Moser et al.
(2008). Diﬀerent to Moser et al. (2008), they exploit the sectoral dimension of the data.
They do not include controls for time-varying multilateral resistance terms. Finally, they
do not study how guarantees interact with sectoral or export market variables related to
ﬁnancial market frictions.
Our paper is also related to an increasing body of literature on the importance of trade
ﬁnance. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) argue that international transactions are more strongly
aﬀected by ﬁnancial frictions than domestic ones. First, due to the longer shipment, they
require a larger amount of working capital by the exporter to cover the cost of goods produced
but not yet delivered. Second, exporters (or their banks) have much less recourse in the event
of international trade credit defaults. As a consequence, ﬁnancial crises aﬀect exports more
strongly than domestic sales. While Amiti and Weinstein (2011) study how the health of
banks aﬀects Japanese ﬁrm-level exports, our emphasis is on the role of public guarantee
schemes for exports and their interactions with ﬁnancial market variables. Those guarantees
are particularly valuable if the importer can neither pay in advance nor oﬀer a letter of credit.
In those cases, exporters engage in an open accounts transaction which leaves them uncovered
against default of the importer. With complete ﬁnancial markets, the exporter could insure
against the trade credit default risk through the banking system (e.g., via documentary
collection); this amounts to a de facto sale of claims on the importer. In practice, the market
for such insurance does not appear to function well.6 This interpretation is consistent with
recent ﬁndings of Chor and Manova (2011), who provides evidence that credit constraints
strongly aﬀect exports. Our paper relates to hers in that we also use sectoral trade data;
albeit only for a single country (Germany). Instead of using a sample selection model, we
estimate the eﬀect of public guarantees in a linear model with a complete set of binary ﬁxed
6In a fascinating single-ﬁrm case study, Antras and Foley (2011) show that letters of credit play a more
subdued role than usually believed. They also oﬀer a model that sheds light on the ﬁrm’s choice between
diﬀerent trade ﬁnance instruments.
3eﬀects interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes export credit guarantees in Germany
and provides some descriptive evidence. Section 3 explains how our empirical strategy deals
with unobserved heterogeneity. Section 4 presents results for the average Hermes eﬀects and
compares it to earlier results. Section 5 extends the analysis to diﬀerent income groups and
countries, while section 6 considers the eﬀect of Hermes guarantees during the ﬁnancial crises.
The ﬁnal section provides a summary and policy conclusions.
2 Data: Exports and Credit Guarantees in Germany
The German government guarantees export credit claims of ﬁrms located in Germany for
certain destination countries and sectors (markets). These guarantees are referred to as
“Hermes Guarantees”. Budgetary responsibility for this instrument lies with the Federal
Government that decides on basic issues of cover policy and the granting of guarantees in
an Interministerial Committee (IMC). The conditions of these guarantees with respect to
the scope of covered countries, sectors, and costs incurred are deﬁned in the arrangement on
oﬃcially supported export credits also known as the OECD consensus. A crucial objective
of the consensus is the encouragement of ”competition among exporters based on quality and
price of goods and services exported rather than on the most favorable oﬃcially supported
ﬁnancial terms and conditions” (OECD, 2011).7 In Germany the guarantees are issued by a
consortium made up by PriceWaterhouseCoopers-AG and the Hermes-Kreditversicherungs-
AG on behalf of the Republic of Germany. Insurance is extended against payment of a
premium which reﬂects the riskiness of the underlying market and the ﬁnancial health of
the importer.8 Proﬁts or losses made by the consortium are directly incorporated into the
German federal budget. Table I presents Euler Hermes’ aggregate results for the past years.
Until the late 70s, there were no noteworthy peaks in overall proﬁts and losses. However,
due to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Eastern Europe, as
well as due to several debt-crises of emerging economies between 1982 and 1999, Hermes
guarantees lead to a cumulated net loss to the government amounting to 13.4 billion Euros.
In those years, the German government started to sign debt restructuring agreement with
the largest debtors. As a consequence, the cumulated losses could be run down again. In
7The Participants to the Arrangement are: Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, Korea
(Republic of), New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.
8Euler Hermes employs a risk deﬁnition based on OECD country risk measures. For a detailed overview
consult http://www.agaportal.de/en/aga/deckungspolitik/laenderklassiﬁzierung.html
4Table I: Cumulative proﬁts/losses of Euler Hermes in million Euros, 1954 - 2010
1954 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2006 2010
14 -95 -77 -155 548 -338 -3657 -11972 -13407 -11036 181 2081
Notes: Figures represent cumulative Euler Hermes results in million Euros. Yearly proﬁts and
losses are cumulated over time. Source: Euler Hermes annual reports.
2006, the cumulated net proﬁt position was close to zero; in the following years it became
positive. Besides positive yearly net contributions after 1999, the pay-back of Russian debt
in 2006 made a substantial diﬀerence.9
The German guarantee system provides three types of instruments. The most impor-
tant, both in terms of exporters covered and export volumes guaranteed, are so called
‘Einzeldeckungen’ (EZDs). Those refer to single, well-deﬁned projects, for speciﬁc mar-
kets (i.e., destinations and sectors) and importers. The second most relevant instrument is
called ‘Ausfuhrpauschalgewährleistungen’ (APGs). These cover a number of diﬀerent im-
porters, possibly in diﬀerent markets. A third instrument, revolving guarantees, is of very
minor importance as it makes up less than 2 percent of all guarantees. The speciﬁc design
of instruments implies that only EZDs can be allocated to destinations and sectors without
measurement error. For this reason, in what follows, we concentrate on this instrument.
Euler Hermes uses an internal industry classiﬁcation deﬁning 10 main sectors based on the
type of covered products. Each sector can be disaggregated into 4 and 6 digit subheadings
(see table A.1 in the appendix).
For all empirical tests we employ bilateral export data using the world trade BACI
database provided by CEPII Paris. Our focus is the manufacturing sector. Initially, ex-
ports are provided at the HS 6-digit product disaggregation which we transform into NACE
1.1 classiﬁcation based on correspondence tables from eurostat (RAMON database).10 Be-
cause both the NACE 1.1 and the internal Hermes classiﬁcations are product based, it is
possible to allocate EZDs to sectoral exports. Appendix A.2 lists those 42 sectors for which
a clean match between Hermes data and export data was possible. Export credit guarantees
are strongly sector-biased: only 24 sectors record suﬃcient Hermes activities to conduct an
empirical analysis.
9In August 2006 Russia payed oﬀ its Paris club debts of 25.2 billion Euros, of which Germany received 8
billion Euros (Aga-report, 2006). For a detailed overview of yearly Euler Hermes results see also table A1 in
Moser et al., 2008.
10Nace 1.1: Statistical Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev. 1.1. For a
detailed overview of correspondence tables consult
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/index.cfmT?argetUrl=DSP_PUB_WELC
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Source: Euler Hermes, BACI data base.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of German exports over time in nominal terms (dashed
line, right axis). Exports have increased by about 71 percent from 2000 to 2008, and have
plunged by about 22 percent from 2008 to 2009. At the same time, the share of total exports
covered by public guarantees has evolved in a counter-cyclical fashion. It has fallen from
almost 3.5 percent in 2000 to less than 2 percent in 2007. Interestingly, the use of guarantees
has increased even before the Lehman Brother default in September 2008, and has steeply
increased further from 2008 in 2009 to reach 3 percent.
Figure 2 plots the share of EZDs in total guarantees issued over time (solid line, right
axis). From 2000 to 2009, the relative importance of EZDs has steadily increased. In 2009,
almost 70 percent of all guarantees were issued under this form. Hence, it appears sensible to
focus on EZDs in our empirical analysis. Despite increased popularity of the instrument, the
share of German export markets (sectors  industries) covered by EZDs has declined from 3
to 2 percent over the period and has only perked up a little after the crisis. The implication of
this fact is that export credit guarantees are concentrated on only a few markets. Therefore
it is crucial to work with empirical models that can deal with the fact that most markets
feature zero coverage by public guarantees.
Figure 3 plots average Hermes coverage ratios (guarantees accumulated over 2000-2009
divided by accumulated exports) for 11 regions. Table A.3 provides an overview of all coun-
tries in each region. Hermes coverage is smallest in rich industrialized countries (the ‘old’ EU
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Year
Per cent of EZD in total guarantee volume (left axis)
Per cent of markets covered by EZD (right axis)
Notes: EZDs are strictly project based export credit guarantees. Source: Euler
Hermes.
Figure 3: Hermes coverage ratio and average country risk by region
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Hermes coverage ratio by region
Notes: OECD country risk classiﬁcation (7 highest, 0 lowest risk). Source: Euler
Hermes and BACI data base.
countries alias EU15, new EU countries, and other OECD countries (i.e., US, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia). Coverage ratios are slightly higher in rich East Asian countries (Korea,
7Singapore, Taiwan, Japan). Coverage in East Asia (which includes China), Latin America
(including the Caribbean) and South Asia (most notably India, Indonesia, Bangladesh) lies
above the grand mean of 3 percent at 4 to 5 percent. Exports to Eastern and Southern Eu-
rope (the former URSS including Russia, Turkey, former Yugoslavia) display coverage ratios
of about 7 percent. Coverage ratios are highest in the Middle East (8.5 percent of all exports
covered) and for small Paciﬁc Islands. Figure 3 juxtaposes average country risk indicators
published by the OECD against the coverage ratios. The picture suggests that the correlation
between the two measures is clearly positive across all country groups, but turns negative
if one looks at countries in the upper two thirds of the coverage ratio. Hence, it remains
unclear whether Hermes guarantees are clearly targeted towards transactions which involve
an importer in a particularly risky country.
Figure 4: Hermes coverage and external ﬁnancial constraints by sector - 2009 -
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Notes: Sectoral external ﬁnance constraint is measured within each sector as (tan-
gible assets)/(total assets). Relative more collateral decreases ﬁnancial constraints.
Coverage = (accumulated export guarantees) / (accumulated exports). Appendix
A.2 provides the sector nomenclatures. Sectors which do not exhibit export guaran-
tees are excluded (which are: 2-16, 23, 23.2, 25.2, 35, 36-93). Source: Euler Hermes
and BACI data base.
Figure 4 presents average Hermes coverage rates (accumulated export credit guarantees
divided by accumulated exports) for 16 sectors with positive guarantees in 2009. Hermes
coverage turns out to be speciﬁcally high in sectors with relatively large external ﬁnance
constraints, a measure which we construct from ﬁrm level data (Amadeus-Hoppenstedt) using
balance sheet information (tangible assets over total assets). A higher ratio indicates the
availability of more collateral which as the literature argues (Feenstra et al., 2011) alleviates
8external ﬁnance constraints. With a coverage rate of 5 and 9.8 percent the machinery (29)
and aircraft (35.3) sectors lie both far above the grand mean coverage rate of 3 percent.
Simultaneously, with a tangible assets over total asset ratio of 0.23 and 0.14, respectively, both
sectors exhibit collateral signiﬁcantly below the average share of 0.28. On the other hand,
sectors like basic metals (27) and manufactured tools (28.62) display tangible over total assets
ratios of 0.33 and 0.32, far above the average ratio indicating low external ﬁnance constraints.
For these sectors the coverage rate lies below 0.1 percent. These descriptive ﬁgures point to a
clearly positive correlation between the coverage rate and external ﬁnance constraints across
sectors. Hence, the incidence of Hermes guarantees is stronger in industries with higher
degrees of ﬁnancial constraints. To account for this, it is necessary to conduct the analysis
on industry-level data. An analysis on aggregate data may suﬀer from aggregation bias.
Moreover, the availability of the industry dimension allows us to include interaction terms
between year and destination dummies to control for time-varying multilateral resistance
terms, avoiding the estimation biases highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
3 Empirical Strategy
Let i denote an export destination (a country), s a sector, and t time. We refer to an export







where HERMESi;s;t is either the ln of coverage applied to new business underwritten by
Hermes in a speciﬁc year for a speciﬁc export market and a speciﬁc sector (lnGuaranteesi;s;t),
a dummy that takes value 1 if a speciﬁc sector in a speciﬁc target market is covered in a speciﬁc
year (Dummyi;s;t), or the share of exports covered by Hermes guarantees (Coveragei;s;t):
HERMESi;s;t 2 flnGuaranteesi;s;t;Dummyi;s;t;Coveragei;s;tg: (2)
While the coeﬃcient attached to the binary variable indicates the extent to which the
sheer availability of Hermes guarantees for a market (a country-industry pair) aﬀects the
volume of exports, the coeﬃcient on lnGuarantees can be interpreted as the elasticity of
exports with respect to the quantity of guarantees. The estimate on Coverage measures
the eﬀectiveness of public export credit insurance. If the estimate is equal to unity, the
percent increase in exports due to Hermes equals the share of exports covered. To the extent
9that the coeﬃcient falls short from unity, the increase in exports is smaller than the share
of exports underwritten and some exports would have taken place even in the absence of
Hermes coverage.
The model includes an extensive set of dummy variables. vi;vs; and vt are complete
vectors of country, sector, and time eﬀects. We include all possible binary interactions be-
tween these vectors. Of course, this nests the simple terms vi;vs;vt: Using this strategy, the
interesting coeﬃcient  is identiﬁed only by variation within export markets over time. We
eliminate vi  vs by the appropriate within transformation of the model, and apply OLS
to the transformed equation. We make the usual assumptions on the error term "i;s;t: Note
that, unlike Moser et al. (2008), we do not run a random eﬀects model since simple Hausman
tests reject random eﬀects over our ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
The vector Xi;s;t contains additional covariates that may or may not vary within export
markets over time. In our baseline regression, where we constrain 
0 = 0; and when all those
ﬁxed eﬀects combinations are used, there are no direct eﬀects of Xi;s;t since we have no time-
variant information on German export markets (deﬁned as country-industry pairs) except
Hermes provisions. However, in some regressions, we use interactions of HERMESi;s;t with
sector-level or export-market variables (such as, for example, foreign interest rates). Also, to
see how our more general framework compares with results obtained by Moser et al. (2008),
we drop some of the ﬁxed eﬀects and add direct eﬀects of the vector Xi;s;t to the equation.
Note that the empirical model (1) is consistent with a theoretical gravity equation as
derived, e.g., by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Those authors have shown that it
is necessary to control for multilateral resistance to obtain unbiased estimates of bilateral
variables that restrict trade. Multilateral resistance terms capture the burden of average
trade costs that aﬀect a market, i.e., a weighted measure of all bilateral trade costs. In our
context, where there is only one exporter (Germany), multilateral resistance terms for the
export markets are absorbed by the vi  vt interactions. These dummies also account for
all other constant or time-varying inﬂuences of German exports into some foreign country,
such as that country’s geographical position relative to Germany, its GDP, the stance of its
trade arrangements with the European Union (and hence with Germany), the exchange rate
of that country with respect to the Euro, and so forth. Importantly, it also accounts for
unobserved heterogeneity, related to things such as actual transportation costs or historical
and cultural ties to export markets.
The vi vs interactions account for all time-invariant features of foreign export markets.
For instance, they control for the foreign comparative advantage structure relative to Ger-
many; they also control for sector-speciﬁc foreign regulation (for example, hard to observe
10non tariﬀ barriers to trade), as long as it does not change over time. The vsvt interactions,
in turn, control for all global or Germany-speciﬁc sectoral trends. For instance, they capture
the evolution of German price competitiveness on the sector level, the German business cycle
(and, associated with it, ﬁnancial factors such as lending rates or the incidence of ﬁnancial
frictions). If a product or process innovation in some sector boosts German exports into all
export markets, this will be equally captured by those dummies. The extensive use of dummy
variables minimizes the risk that the eﬀect of Hermes on sectoral exports, ; is contaminated
by omitted variables bias. We will see that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the
described way does indeed make a diﬀerence in the obtained estimate. Nonetheless we are
cautious not to interpret our estimate ^  as causal. The problem is reverse causation. It is
conceivable that a positive shock "i;s;t on exports can cause the German government to grant
(or withdraw) export guarantees for a speciﬁc export market (i.e., a destination country,
sector combination) in a speciﬁc year. However, compared to existing studies, such as Moser
et al. (2008) or Egger and Url (2006), we believe that our more general framework minimizes
those problems.
4 The Export-Enhancing Role of Public Export Credit
Guarantees
In this section, we ﬁrst present evidence on the export-enhancing role of public guarantees.
We compare our results with the study that is closest to ours (Moser et al., 2008). Next,
we compare the estimated Hermes coeﬃcients across diﬀerent world regions, sectors, and
over time. Finally, we investigate whether country-level ﬁnancial institutions or sector-level
ﬁnancial vulnerability condition in a systematic way the eﬀect of Hermes guarantees on
sectoral exports.
4.1 A Fixed Eﬀects Model for German Exports
Table II shows results for four Hermes variables. To facilitate comparison with the literature,
this table does not yet contain countryyear eﬀects. Standard errors are corrected for cluster-
ing at the panel variable level (country-industry pairs). All regressions contain industry-year
eﬀects and are estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estimation. Column (1) starts with the bi-
nary Hermes variable. The point estimate of 0.173 suggests that a market (country-industry
pair), in which public export credit guarantees have been used, had exports 17.3 percent
larger than if those guarantees had not been available. This is a substantial eﬀect, estimated
11at excellent levels of precision. Note, however, that guarantees were available only to 2 to
3 percent of all markets in the sample period. The trade creation due to Hermes therefore
amounts to at most 0.52 percent of total German exports. The estimated eﬀect on GDP is
positive, as expected, and signiﬁcant. The OECD country risk variable shows that risk is a
strong deterrent of exports: ceteris paribus, an increase from the lowest (0) to the highest
(7) risk category lowers exports by almost 45 percent.11 The positive coeﬃcients on the ratio
of capital formation over GDP and on manufacturing imports in total imports is consistent
with ﬁndings by Egger and Url (2006) and Moser et al. (2008), signalling that Germany
exports more to countries with a similar factor endowment.
Column (2) uses the second Hermes variable, namely the log of guarantees. The point
estimate on guarantees turns out to be 0.014; i.e., half as large as the eﬀect estimated by
Moser et al. (2008).12 Coeﬃcients on the other variables in the model are almost totally
identical to column (1). The elasticity suggests that a one percent increase in guarantees
boosts exports by about 0.014 percent. This seems a minor eﬀect, but one has to bear in
mind that only about 3 percent of exports are covered. Taking this fact into account, simple
back-on-the-envelope calculations yield an eﬀectiveness ratio (Euros of exports per euros used
as guarantees) of 0.47.13 In column (2), the Hermes variable is deﬁned as ln(guarantees+1).
Admittedly, this transformation is ad hoc; however, it serves to account for the vast majority
of export relationships in which no public guarantees were used. Column (3) deﬁnes the
Hermes variable as ln(guarantees), so that all relationships without guarantees are dropped.
The number of observations falls from 42,669 to 1,456, but the estimated elasticity remains
broadly comparable to the one estimated before. Statistical signiﬁcance suﬀers, though.14
Finally, column (4) uses guarantees over exports (coverage) as the Hermes variable. This
practice allows to deal with instances of zero guarantees and does not require ad hoc trans-
formation of the interesting independent variable. The point estimate of 0.658 suggests that
an increase in the share of exports covered by one point leads to additional exports of 0.66
percent. In other words, for one euro of guarantees, exports increase by 0.66 euros.
Whether these results hold when a more restrictive econometric setup is used (additional
countryyear eﬀects) remains to be seen. Before addressing this issue, a comparison of the
results in Table II to those in the literature is due. Moser et al. (2008) study how political
11Calculated as (expf 0:066g   1)  7 =  0:447
12Table A.5 in the Appendix shows that using aggregate rather than sectoral data leads to the same point
estimate of 0.014. Note, however, that the Hermes variable is deﬁned slightly diﬀerently in Table A.5.
13Let exports be 100 and the level of guarantees 3. A 10 percent increase in guarantees (level change of
0.3) leads to a 0.14 percent increase in exports (level change of 0.14). The eﬀectiveness ratio is 0.14/0.3.
14Table A.4 provides the summary statistics.
12Table II: Fixed Eﬀects Models for German Exports, 2000-2009
Dep.var. Ln exports, by sector.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hermes variable Binary ln Guarantees ln Guarantees, Coverage
pos. only
Hermes 0.173*** 0.014*** 0.017* 0.658***
(0.032) (0.002) (0.007) (0.130)
ln GDP 0.357*** 0.357*** -0.217 0.360***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.228) (0.061)
ln Population -0.138 -0.137 -0.293 -0.149
(0.201) (0.201) (0.686) (0.201)
Customs Union (0,1) 0.083* 0.084* -0.035 0.079
(0.042) (0.042) (0.083) (0.042)
Integration Agreement (0,1) -0.011 -0.010 0.019 -0.012
(0.042) (0.042) (0.108) (0.042)
ln exchange rate 0.003 0.003 0.047 0.004
(0.029) (0.029) (0.096) (0.029)
OECD Country risk -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.003 -0.066***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.037) (0.014)
Capital formation 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.787*** 0.203***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.152) (0.042)
Manufacturing imports 0.130* 0.130* 0.156 0.132*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.167) (0.058)
Within R-squared 0.110 0.110 0.563 0.110
No. of observations 42669 42669 1456 42669
No. of markets 5434 5434 517 5434
Chi2 Hausman 747.25*** 719.44*** 135.91*** 475.81***
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust standard errors corrected
for clustering along the destination country  sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions
contain year  industry eﬀects (not shown). Country  sector eﬀects are eliminated by within trans-
formation. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random eﬀects speciﬁcation
in each model.
risk conditions the eﬀect of export credit guarantees and consider the dynamics of the gravity
relationship. Our focus is diﬀerent; nonetheless it is encouraging to see that we can reproduce
the results of that earlier study in spite of the fact that our data diﬀer from Moser et al.’s in
several ways. First, we cover a diﬀerent decade (2000-2009 instead of 1992-2003), second, we
13disaggregate over two-digit industries, and third, we include only those guarantees for which
a sectoral allocation is possible (EZDs).
The diﬀerence of our results with respect to those shown by Moser et al. (2008) mostly
result from our use of a ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model and not so much from the fact that we
use sectoral data. Table A.5 in the Appendix reproduces the model employed by Moser et
al. (2008) on our more recent aggregate data.15 Column (1) reports a ﬁxed eﬀects model,
column (2) additionally corrects the variance-covariance matrix for serial correlation of error
terms over time. Column (3) is the random eﬀects (RE) model used in Moser et al.’s Table
1. A Hausman test very clearly rejects the Null that estimated parameter diﬀerences are
non-systematic. The more eﬃcient RE model is therefore rejected in favor of the less eﬃcient
but consistent FE model. The point estimate on the ln of guarantees is 0.014 (only modestly
signiﬁcant statistically when correcting the error structure) in the FE speciﬁcation while it
is 0.02 in the RE model. Moser et al. use the same RE model and ﬁnd an eﬀect of 0.028.
Column (4) replicates Moser et al.’s RE-Mundlak model, conﬁrming on our data that the
long-run eﬀect (0.100) is much larger than the short-run one (0.015). Columns (5) to (8) add
political risk to the model. As before, the RE-model is rejected very clearly, and statistical
signiﬁcance is modest in the FE model. Interestingly, the inclusion of political risk into the
model barely aﬀects point eﬀects of guarantees in our 2000-2009 panel, while it had a strong
reducing eﬀect in the Moser et al. exercise.
Table III reports results from our most general ﬁxed eﬀects design based on equation
(1). The model diﬀers from that used in Table II in so far that it includes a comprehensive
set of additional country-year eﬀects. The theoretical foundation of the gravity model by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) requires that the econometric speciﬁcation accounts for the
average (multilateral) price faced by foreign consumers. Typically, this multilateral resistance
index diﬀers from price indices as computed by statistical oﬃces and is, therefore, essentially
unobservable. It captures the degree of competition faced by German ﬁrms in foreign markets
and can be controlled for by using ﬁxed eﬀects (Feenstra, 2004). Moreover, the use of
country-year eﬀects accounts for any unobserved heterogeneity that positively aﬀects both
the probability of Hermes coverage and exports. If a positive shock hits an export destination,
political pressure to grant export credit guarantees might go up as opportunities for ﬁrms
are bigger. For these reasons, one can conjecture that the omission of country-year eﬀects
leads to an overestimation of the Hermes eﬀect.
Comparing the upper half of Table III to the results in Table II shows that there is
15The model by Moser et al. (2008) contains regional dummies, year dummies, and uses random eﬀects
estimation.
14Table III: Three-Way Fixed Eﬀects Models for German Exports, 2000-2009
Dep.var. Ln exports, by sector.
Hermes variable: Binary ln Guarantees ln Guarantees, pos. Coverage
Sample as in Table I, (N=42,669)
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)
Hermes 0.162*** 0.013*** 0.019 0.667***
(0.032) (0.002) (0.017) (0.131)
R-squared 0.141 0.142 0.765 0.142
Full Sample, (N=64,957)
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4b)
Hermes 0.158*** 0.012*** 0.018 0.633***
(0.029) (0.002) (0.016) (0.119)
R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.749 0.150
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust standard errors corrected
for clustering along the destination country  sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions
contain year  industry eﬀects and year  country eﬀects (not shown). Country  sector eﬀects are
eliminated by within transformation. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects
random eﬀects speciﬁcation in each model.
indeed some overestimation in columns (1) to (3), but the bias appears very minor. Using
the binary measure, Table II overestimates by about 6.7 percent; using ln guarantees as the
Hermes variable, Table II overestimates by about 7.8 percent. The eﬀect on the coverage
ratio is essentially unchanged by adding country-year eﬀects. Excluding all markets (country-
industry pairs) for which no Hermes activity is recorded, the general model of Table III ﬁnds
no eﬀect of Hermes on exports anymore (column (3A). Here, the number of observations
is not suﬃcient to compensate the loss in degrees of freedom entailed by the inclusion of a
large number of additional dummies. The conclusion is that working with the models used
in Table II does not lead to a strong bias in results.
The OECD country risk measure is not available for all countries to which Germany
exports. Hence, when the use of country-year eﬀects makes the inclusion of country-level
variables redundant, the number of observations goes up by nearly 50 percent from 42,669
to 64,957 country-industry-year combinations. The lower half of Table III makes use of this
larger sample. It appears that point estimates fall relative to the smaller sample, but they
15remain qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to those obtained earlier.
4.2 Testing for Dynamic Eﬀects
It is often thought that public export guarantees help exporters to gain a ﬁrst access to a
hitherto unserved market in that they facilitate up front ﬁnancing of entry costs. Then, even
when the guarantees expire, exports into that market remain higher than in the counterfactual
case where no guarantee has ever been granted. To test this hypothesis, we introduce lagged
Hermes variables into the regression (1). The estimation results are displayed in Table IV.
It becomes apparent that the instantaneous eﬀect of the guarantees dominates. Lags, in
particular those beyond ﬁrst order, do not matter. However, it is also clear, that the estimated
instantaneous eﬀects are considerably smaller than those obtained in a model without lags
(e.g., Table III). This is particularly true for the binary Hermes indicator, which is probably
best suited to test for the market access facilitation hypothesis. The diﬀerence between
point estimate on the instantaneous eﬀect and the long run eﬀect suggests that past Hermes
coverage of a market causes additional exports to increase by about 2 percent.
Table IV: Delayed Hermes Eﬀects, 2000-2009
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy Guarantees Coverage
Hermest 0.139*** 0.011*** 0.624**
(0.037) (0.003) (0.229)
Hermest 1 0.029 0.002 0.159
(0.027) (0.002) (0.132)
Hermest 2 0.004 0.000 0.085
(0.029) (0.002) (0.211)
Hermest 3 -0.010 -0.001 -0.110
(0.027) (0.002) (0.151)
Within R-squared 0.156 0.157 0.157
No. of observations 40,032 40,032 40,032
No. of markets 6,443 6,443 6,443
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Ro-
bust standard errors corrected for clustering along the destination
country  sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions con-
tain year  industry eﬀects and year  country eﬀects (not shown).
Country  sector eﬀects are eliminated by within transformation.
* p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random
eﬀects speciﬁcation in each model.
165 Hermes eﬀects across income groups, regions, and time
In the next step, we show that the eﬀect of public guarantees is heterogeneous with respect
to country income groups, world regions, and time. Pooling across those subsamples results
in an unbiased average eﬀect but hides potentially interesting diﬀerences across groups.
5.1 The Hermes eﬀect across income groups
First, we study the eﬀect of Hermes guarantees in country samples diﬀerentiated with respect
to income per capita levels. Following the World Bank classiﬁcation, we work with four
income groups. We do not run independent regressions, but simply include the full set of
interactions between country group indicators and the respective Hermes variable into the
model. Table V presents estimated Hermes coeﬃcients. The key insight is that guarantees
have no measurable export-boosting eﬀect for exports into countries belonging to the lowest
income per capita class. Column (1) looks at the binary Hermes indicator. There, the eﬀect
is strongest for countries belonging to the lower middle income class: German exports into
a market covered by Hermes increase by about 17.4 percent. That eﬀect falls to 16.8 and to
15.7 percent once one looks at higher middle income or highest income countries. A similar
pattern is visible for the ln guarantees in column (2). Focussing on strictly positive guarantees
leads to problems of statistical inference. Finally, column (4) looks at the share of exports
covered. Again, there is no measurable eﬀect for the lowest income countries. Interestingly,
the clear ordering of eﬀect sizes across income groups obtained in columns (1) and (2) is no
longer visible.
Summarizing, Table V shows that public export credit guarantees boost exports more
in medium income countries than in the poorest or the richest segment. This is nicely
consistent with the hypothesis that per capita income correlates strongly and inversely with
credit market constraints: If constraints are weak, there is little need for public guarantees,
and so they make little diﬀerence. If per capita income is very low, market potential for goods
typically covered by Hermes (machinery, transport equipment) is low, too. Interestingly, the
parameter on the coverage ratio is highest for the richest countries, indicating maximum
eﬀectiveness of the instruments for this income group.
5.2 The Hermes Eﬀect over World Regions
Descriptive statistics show that Hermes guarantees are also heterogeneous with respect to
diﬀerent world regions (see e.g. Figure 3). For a systematic analysis of credit guarantees’
17Table V: The Hermes Eﬀect Across Income Groups, 2000-2009
Dep.var. Ln exports, by sector.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hermes variable
Per capita Dummy ln Guarantees ln Guarantees Coverage
income group pos.
Lowest -0.066 -0.004 0.023 -0.124
(0.079) (0.006) (0.062) (0.327)
Lower Middle 0.174** 0.014** 0.003 0.623*
(0.067) (0.005) (0.031) (0.244)
Higher Middle 0.168*** 0.013*** 0.027 0.585***
(0.046) (0.003) (0.021) (0.167)
Highest 0.157*** 0.012*** -0.004 0.838**
(0.044) (0.003) (0.028) (0.259)
Within R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.750 0.150
No. of observations 64,957 64,957 1,618 64,957
No. of markets 7,787 7,787 5,71 7,787
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust standard er-
rors corrected for clustering along the destination country  sector dimension displayed
in brackets. All regressions contain year  industry eﬀects and year  country ef-
fects (not shown). Country  sector eﬀects are eliminated by within transformation.
* p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random eﬀects speciﬁcation
in each model.
export eﬀects across regions, we allocate all Hermes relevant countries to 11 geographical
regions. Similar to the previous income group estimations, we extend our empirical speciﬁ-
cation (1) by including the set of interaction terms between deﬁned world regions and the
respective Hermes variable. Table VI presents the results for the three diﬀerent Hermes
measures (Dummy, ln-Guarantees and Coverage). Column (1) lists estimates for the binary
Hermes indicator. Accordingly, the strongest export enhancing eﬀect of Hermes guarantees
is observed in South Asia. The provision of export credit guaranties for this region, which
include emerging economies like India and Indonesia, increases exports on average by 29
percent. The second largest eﬀect is observed in EU 15 countries, with additional 23 percent
more exports. Compared to the average export enhancing eﬀect of Hermes in a pooled esti-
mation across countries (15.8 percent) these two regions obtain additionally 13 and 7 percent
more exports.
The above average eﬀects in South Asia are expected and can be explained by destination
frictions and riskier business conditions. However, this argument does not hold generally for
18Table VI: The Hermes eﬀect across world regions, 2000-2009
Dep.var. Ln exports, by sector.
(1) (2) (3)
Hermes variable
Region Dummy ln Guarantees Coverage
Subsaharan Africa -0.022 0.001 -0.019
(0.088) (0.007) (0.304)
New EU 0.192** 0.015** 1.031**
(0.072) (0.005) (0.321)
Eastern and Southern Europe 0.177* 0.013* 0.598*
(0.077) (0.006) (0.269)
Latin America 0.184** 0.015** 0.433
(0.067) (0.006) (0.266)
Middle East 0.046 0.005 0.524*
(0.058) (0.004) (0.260)
EU15 0.230* 0.015* 1.375
(0.096) (0.006) (0.707)
East Asia 0.255 0.017 0.438
(0.171) (0.012) (0.563)
Rich East Asia 0.106 0.008 0.456
(0.097) (0.007) (0.566)
Other OECD 0.152 0.010 1.202
(0.152) (0.011) (0.752)
South Asia 0.279* 0.020* 0.730
(0.122) (0.008) (0.410)
Islands 0.072 0.006 0.553
(0.128) (0.008) (0.427)
Within R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15
No. of observations 64,957 64,957 64,957
No. of markets 7,787 7,787 7,787
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust
standard errors corrected for clustering along the destination country 
sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions contain year  in-
dustry eﬀects and year  country eﬀects (not shown). Country  sector
eﬀects are eliminated by within transformation. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random eﬀects speciﬁcation in each
model.
the EU 15. One reason for the high Hermes eﬀect in Europe lies in sectoral characteristics,
in particular the aircraft industry, which accounts for a major share of guarantees. Export
19credit guarantees in the aircraft industry appear in irregular intervals, but when they appear
they tend to be huge. Within the EU 15, Hermes activity is practically conﬁned to the
aviation industry. This policy was only relaxed during and after the recent ﬁnancial crises;
we return to this below. In countries of the New EU group, Latin America and Eastern and
Southern Europe, the provision of Hermes guarantees leads to additional exports between 19
and 17.7 percent. These regions show a slightly above average Hermes eﬀect, if compared
with a pooled regression across countries.
In column (2) the Hermes variable is deﬁned as ln(guarantees) and its strong eﬀect in
South Asian countries is maintained. The point estimate in this region results as 0.02 ex-
ceeding the pooled regression estimate by 0.008 percentage points. Interestingly, for EU 15
countries the point estimate turns out to be 0.015 equalling those of Latin America and the
New EU countries. Furthermore, for the remaining regions, results turn out to be close to the
estimated average eﬀect across all countries, which is an elasticity of 0.012. Hence, controlling
for the Hermes impact on exports based on a volume measure changes the ordering of results,
in such a way that the over average export credit guarantee impact in EU 15 countries is
less pronounced. Furthermore, variation in the signiﬁcant estimates across regions turns out
to be small, except for Asia. Column (3) uses again guarantees over exports as the Hermes
variable, measuring the eﬀectiveness of the public instrument.
One important observation from these results is that estimates for regions dominated by
advanced economies (EU 15, other OECD, and New EU) exceed unity. An increase in export
shares to these regions is larger than the covered share of exports. A possible interpretation
is that Hermes driven exports serve as source of information for other companies triggering
further market entries. For the remaining regions the extent of the coeﬃcient is below unity,
pointing on the fact that some exports into these region would have taken place even without
Hermes. Interestingly, for East Asia, which includes China and Viet Nam, we do not observe
a signiﬁcant Hermes eﬀect.
5.3 The Hermes Eﬀect over Time
Next, we interact the respective Hermes variable with year dummies. The estimated coef-
ﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant (with the exception of 2009) in the case of the Hermes
dummy. One could conjecture that the export-enhancing eﬀect of public export credit in-
surance is highest in periods of slow export growth. Figure 5 plots the coeﬃcients on the
Hermes dummy over time and contrast them with the evolution of the growth rate of nominal
exports. However, the evidence that the strength of the eﬀect on Hermes is countercyclical
20is rather weak.16
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Notes: Black solid line: Estimated Hermes dummy (dashed lines denote 90% con-
ﬁdence interval). For the detailed year-speciﬁc Hermes eﬀects see the Appendix,
Table A.6. Red solid line (right axis): ln of exports.
5.4 Sectoral Eﬀects
There is substantial heterogeneity with respect to the industry-level impact of Hermes guar-
antees. Figure 6 plots the coeﬃcients obtained for the Hermes dummy in 24 sectors for which
positive Hermes guarantees have been recorded at least in one year. It also plots the 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Out of 24 sectors, in 8 we have signiﬁcant evidence for positive eﬀects.
They are concentrated in the following sectors: publishing and printing (22), machinery and
equipment (29), oﬃce machinery and computer (30), radio, television and communication
equipment (32), ships and boats (35.1), rail- and tramway (35.2), air- and spacecraft (35.3)
and transport equipment (35.5). The largest eﬀects with point estimates of 1.2, 0.9 and 0.5
are obtained in the aviation, shipbuilding and transportation sectors, respectively. Symp-
tomatic for these sectors are large export values and high time-to-build schedules coupled
with high external ﬁnance dependence (see Figure 4). These results suggest that Hermes
guarantees may play a role in alleviating industry-level ﬁnancial vulnerability to capital mar-
16See Table A.6 in the Appendix for detailed results.
21ket frictions. Furthermore, excluding the four sectors with the largest Hermes eﬀects from
the regression does not change the results in the remaining industries.





























































































Notes: Sectoral eﬀects computed within a single equation ﬁxed eﬀects model for 24
sectors. Hermes is modeled as dummy. Point estimates plus/minus 1.96 standard
errors (upper and lower margin of the 95% conﬁdence interval). Appendix A.2
lists the sector names. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering along the
destination country  sector dimension. Signiﬁcance levels are tagged as:  p<0.01,
 p<0.05,^<0.1.
The observed sector distribution of Hermes eﬀects partly reﬂects the importance of EZDs
relative to other insurance instruments. For example, the chemical or automotive industries
do not make much use of EZDs. The distribution also reﬂects the fact that industries diﬀer
with respect to their ﬁnancial vulnerability. Hence, public export guarantees have heteroge-
neous eﬀects on their performance.
6 Hermes and capital market imperfections
This section asks two question. First, do public guarantees remedy destination country capital
market imperfections, i.e., frictions faced by the importer? And second, do they alleviate
industry level vulnerabilities to capital market frictions?
226.1 Hermes and Import Country Financial Market Maturity
We now interact variables describing the ﬁnancial market maturity (FMM) of import coun-
tries with Hermes variables. If public export credit guarantees are granted because importers
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to obtain credit in order to engage in a cash-in-advance transaction or use
documents-based payment procedures, then Hermes can be considered as an instrument mit-
igating credit market frictions in destination markets.
The hypothesis is that the export-enhancing power of Hermes is larger for import mar-
kets which suﬀer from weak capital market institutions. Beck et al. (2008), and Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt (2009) propose a number of indicators to measure the condition of countries’
ﬁnancial market maturity. We use the most recent release of the data which is provided by
The World Bank.17 These FMM measures correlate strongly with the country risk measure
provided by the OECD. While they are available for a slightly smaller country sample, they
are more relevant in the context of Hermes coverage which aims at providing insurance to
exporters.
Table VII presents results based on ﬁve diﬀerent ﬁnancial market measures for destination
countries (liquid liabilities, private credit, stock market capitalization, stock market total
value traded, value traded over capitalization). For each FMM measure we consider the
eﬀect of the sheer presence of Hermes (Dummy) and also the elasticity of exports with
respect to the quantity of guarantees (ln guarantees). To make the direct eﬀect of FMM
visible, we are no longer able to control for yearcountry eﬀects by dummies. So, we account
for further relevant covariates which reduces our number of observations. In line with results
in related research the quality of ﬁnancial markets in destination countries has a strong and
positive direct eﬀect on exports. For example, column (1) in Table VII shows that German
exports are on average about 1.7 percent higher when the ratio of liquid liabilities over GDP
increases by 10 percent in the destination country. Depending on the chosen FMM measure
this positive trade eﬀect varies between 0.25 and 1.7 percent. Furthermore, it is statistically
robust and independent of whether the Hermes eﬀect is measured by a dummy or guarantee
volumes.
The interesting question is whether Hermes reduces ﬁnancial frictions in import countries.
We test for this by interacting Hermes with the diﬀerent FMM measures. The direct eﬀect
of the binary Hermes measure across all ﬁve speciﬁcations is persistently positive and varies
between 19.5 and 21.9 percent. The direct eﬀect of Hermes on exports has to be understood
as the eﬀect that results when ﬁnancial market conditions in destination countries are worst
17http://econ.worldbank.org
23(FMM= 0). The point estimate lies somewhat above the values found in previous tables;
suggesting that the export-enhancing eﬀect of Hermes is stronger when FMM is low. How-
ever, while the interaction term turns out to be negative across all chosen measures, it is
never statistically signiﬁcant.18 Summarizing, ﬁnancial market maturity of the destination
countries matters for German exports. However, oﬃcial export credit guarantees do not play
a very strong role in lowering the relevance of this variable for German exports.19
18In all our tables, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the countryindustry level. Given the
structure of our data, this is clearly a preferred approach. Note, however, that statistical signiﬁcance is
sometimes dramatically reduced by clustering.
19Using the OECD country risk measure leads to very similar results (of course with opposite signs) than
the measures of Beck et al. (2008): the direct eﬀect is strongly negative and the interaction with Hermes is
positive, albeit without statistical signiﬁcance. Also note that estimated interaction terms look very similar




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































256.2 Hermes and Sector Level Financial Vulnerability
Our ﬁnal empirical exercise analyzes whether public credit guarantees alleviate industry-
speciﬁc ﬁnancial frictions. As ﬁnancial vulnerability presumably matters most during times
of ﬁnancial distress, we add a triple interaction between a crisis dummy, sectoral vulnerability
and the availability of export credit guarantees. We construct sectoral ﬁnancial vulnerability
measures following Chor and Manova (2011), Feenstra et al. (2011) and Askenazy et al.
(2011) who successfully demonstrate that credit constraints have strongly negative eﬀects on
exports. We account for the ﬁnancial crisis by a dummy variable which is positive in the
years 2008/09. We use the Amadeus database for Germany to construct three sectoral vul-
nerability measures based on German ﬁrms’ balance sheets. Our ﬁrst measure is Trade Credit
(trade credit accounts payable/turnover) which measures how much credit ﬁrms receive from
suppliers. Hence, a higher ratio should indicate less ﬁnancial vulnerability. Following Feen-
stra et al. (2011) we use Tangible Assets relative to total asset as a measure for collateral. A
higher share should mitigate credit constraints, thereby increasing exports. Finally, Liquidity
Ratio measures current liabilities over current assets. A higher ratio indicates a sector’s lower
ability to meet its obligations, leading to lower exports.
Table VIII reports ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the chosen credit constraint measures. As
above we use two diﬀerent Hermes deﬁnitions (dummy and ln of guarantees). While the
direct eﬀect of public export guarantees remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant across
all available measures, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial vulnerability turns out to be less clear. A larger
tangible asset share points on higher exports, but it is statistically insigniﬁcant. The remain-
ing two measures have no measurable direct eﬀect on exports. More interestingly, interacting
Hermes with each vulnerability measure provides the expected results: Sectors with a higher
share of tangible assets or trade credits experience a less stronger export enhancing Her-
mes eﬀect as indicated by the negative interaction term (HermesVulnerability). Equally,
sectors with higher liquidity ratios (less liquid) show on average larger exports if Hermes
guarantees are drawn. The extent of these eﬀects and their signiﬁcance diﬀer depending on
the chosen balance sheet measure, but the overall insight is that Hermes coverage lowers the
export-inhibiting eﬀects of industry-level ﬁnancial vulnerability.
Table VIII also reports the additional eﬀect of Hermes in the years of ﬁnancial crises
(HermesCrisis). Accordingly, credit guarantees appear to have a positive eﬀect on exports
in times of ﬁnancial distress, but the evidence is mixed as statistical signiﬁcance is not robust
across all speciﬁcation. Similarly, macroeconomic ﬁnancial distress seem to amplify the export
reducing eﬀect of sectoral credit constraints. Less liquid ﬁrms experienced on average an
additional export collapse during the ﬁnancial crisis (columns 5 and 6). Finally, in order
26Table VIII: Hermes and Sector Level Financial Vulnerability; Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Credit(a) Tangible Assets(b) Liquidity Ratio(c)
Dummy Guarantee Dummy Guarantee Dummy Guarantee
Hermes 0.503*** 0.035*** 0.817*** 0.054*** 0.447*** 0.032***
(0.056) (0.004) (0.113) (0.008) (0.046) (0.003)
Vulnerability -0.000 0.000 0.061 0.059 -0.000 -0.000
(0.020) (0.020) (0.101) (0.101) (0.001) (0.001)
HermesVulnerability -0.163* -0.011* -1.410*** -0.085** 0.005* 0.000
(0.077) (0.005) (0.391) (0.027) (0.002) (0.000)
Hermes  Crisis 0.210** 0.010* 0.406 0.023 0.076 0.001
(0.079) (0.005) (0.334) (0.022) (0.062) (0.004)
Vulnerability  Crisis -0.071 -0.070 0.133 0.128 -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.179) (0.179) (0.003) (0.003)
HermesVulernabilityCrisis 0.156 0.011 -1.058 -0.070 0.028*** 0.002***
(0.100) (0.006) (1.539) (0.103) (0.008) (0.000)
Within R-squared 0.869 0.869 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.869
No of observations 41572 41572 42182 42182 41678 41678
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
along the destination country  sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions contain year  industry
eﬀects and year  country eﬀects (not shown). Country  sector eﬀects are eliminated by within transformation.
* p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random eﬀects speciﬁcation in each model. (a) trade
credit accounts payable/turnover (see e.g. Askenazy et al., 2011); (b) tangible assets/total assets (see e.g. Feenstra,
2011); (c) liquidity ratio current liabilities/current assets (see e.g. Askenazy et al. 2011). Estimates for GDP,
Population, Capital Formation and Man. Imports are included but not listed.
to control for whether public credit guarantees mitigated sector speciﬁc credit constraints
in particular during the ﬁnancial crisis, we interact Hermes with vulnerability and the crisis
dummy. The results are mixed. While sectors with low liquidity and a low share of tangible
assets experienced an additional export enhancing Hermes eﬀect, there is no statistical eﬀect
if we consider trade credits.
Summarizing, Table VIII shows that export credit guarantees on average lead to a stronger
increase in exports when industries are characterized by higher degrees of ﬁnancial vulner-
ability. In this context, Hermes appears to be an instrument which partly mitigates credit
constraints. Additionally, one can conclude that public credit guarantees have helped con-
tain the export collapse during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Hermes helped to reduce the drop
during the crisis in particular in sectors with relative higher credit constraints.
277 Conclusions
Most governments engage in underwriting export credit risk of domestic producers. They
do so, because it is widely believed that certain transactions cannot be privately insured. In
particular, when projects are large and lumpy, or when the deal is exposed to large political
and economic risk in the destination country, international agreements allow the use of public
guarantees. An increasing body of theoretical and empirical research supports this belief: as
shown, amongst others, by Manova et al. (2011), credit constraints do have a trade-inhibiting
eﬀect. A related strand of literature argues that the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/09 has led to
a sharp decline in international trade precisely because it exacerbated credit constraints for
exporters or importers.
So far, the empirical literature on the role of export credit guarantees and on their inter-
action with credit constraints is very small. Building on an earlier contribution by Egger and
Url (2006) for Austria, Moser et al. (2008) use data for Germany to analyze the impact of
oﬃcial export credit guarantees on exports in the presence of political risk. In both papers,
it is shown that this instrument has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on exports. These studies do
not, however, address the eﬀect that public export credit guarantees could have on mitigating
the trade-inhibiting forces of credit market frictions.
In this paper we contribute to the literature by focusing on German export credit guaran-
tees, the so-called Hermes guarantees. Unlike previous studies, we have sectoral data. This
feature allows us to run regressions that include destination-speciﬁc dummies for each year.
Amongst other things, this strategy allows to control for multilateral resistance terms, which
would, if omitted, bias the estimates. Controlling for other sources of unobserved heterogene-
ity, we document the export-enhancing eﬀect of Hermes guarantees between the years 2000
and 2009. A one percent increase in public guarantees boosts exports on average by about
0.012 percent. Compared to Moser et al. (2008), this estimate is substantially lower. Besides
the diﬀerence in the considered period, we deal with unobserved heterogeneity in a fairly
general way. Furthermore, unlike earlier studies, the data rejects the use of a random ef-
fects methodology, so that we rely on the within-transformation to eliminate countrysector
heterogeneity.
We test for diﬀerential eﬀects of Hermes guarantees across countries with diﬀerent income
groups. According to our results, guarantees have a smaller eﬀect in richer countries. A one
percent increase in Hermes boosts exports in the richest countries by 1.2 percent, in higher
middle income countries by 1.3 percent and in lower income countries by 1.4 percent. Hence,
Hermes’ export enhancing eﬀect increases with decreasing average income. This decreasing
correlation supports the hypothesis that there is little need for public guarantees if ﬁnancial
28constraints are weak, which is the case in richer countries. Our exceptional data allows us
furthermore, to control for sector speciﬁc eﬀects. We ﬁnd that Hermes eﬀects are particularly
large in a small number of sectors, which are the aviation, shipbuilding and transportation
sectors. These sectors are characterized by high time-to-build lags and large external ﬁnancial
dependence, suggesting that Hermes guarantees alleviate sectoral ﬁnancial frictions. Our
estimations also show clearly, that Hermes is diﬀerently eﬀective in increasing exports across
sectors, regions and income groups.
A ﬁnal set of results relates to the interplay between credit constraints and Hermes cover-
age. We show that ﬁnancial market maturity in destination countries is positively correlated
with exports. Depending on the ﬁnancial market measure a 10 percent increase in desti-
nation market maturity boosts exports on average by up to 1.7 percent. Across all chosen
measures Hermes turns out to mitigate destination market ﬁnancial frictions. However, in
our preferred ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation estimates turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant. We
also exploit variation across sectors in indicators of ﬁnancial vulnerability. We ﬁnd that the
less vulnerable sectors are with respect to credit constraints, the smaller the positive Her-
mes eﬀect becomes. We also ﬁnd some evidence for Hermes guarantees’ export enhancing
eﬀect during the ﬁnancial crisis. This mitigating Hermes eﬀect during the crisis turns out be
strongest in more vulnerable sectors.
Our results suggest a number of policy implications. Public export credit guarantees
can indeed mitigate ﬁnancial market frictions. But their eﬃciency signiﬁcantly diﬀers across
sectors and countries. In order to minimize export distortions across industries, the instru-
ment should be provided primarily to sectors characterized by high credit constraints, which
appears to be the case e.g. for aviation, shipbuilding and transportation. Importantly, in
countries with the lowest income Hermes does not show a positive export enhancing eﬀect.
Hence, the provision of public guarantees only based on the capital market imperfection ar-
gument is insuﬃcient. In order to prevent large defaults, which Germany experienced in the
late 80s and early 90s, it is crucial to account for further country speciﬁc characteristic like
average income. Otherwise, Hermes default payments are at risk to be misused as windfall
gains.
An important question which we were not able to tackle in this work are third country
eﬀects and competition among countries with respect to the provision of export credit guar-
antees. While our results point on windfall gains in some countries and sectors, we can not
control for whether external eﬀects are the primal source for these observations. The ob-
served increase of Hermes guarantees during the last decade is most likely to be also driven
by other countries’ provision activities in new markets. Further research into this direction
is therefore necessary.
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31A Appendix
Table A.1: Internal Industry Classiﬁcation - Euler Hermes -
Product Group Text Product Group
0101 Belowground Mining
0102 Open Cast Mining
0103 Mineral Processing Industry
0104 Coal Processing
0105 Machine Construction Mining
0201 Oﬀshore Extraction
0202 Oﬀshore Extraction
0203 Natural Gas Processing
0204 Crude Oil Processing
0205 Machine Construction Oil- and Natrual Gas Extraction
0301 Pharmaceutical Industry, Bioengineering
0302 Fertilizer
0303 Other Chemical Industry
0304 Machine Construction Chemistry
0401 Renewable Engergy
0402 Power Plant, fossil powered
0403 Nuclear Power




0505 Facility for Construction of Hauling Means
0506 Haul Means
0507 Traﬃc Infrastructure and Facilities
0508 Water Management
0509 Telecommunication
0510 Computer and Software




0604 Textile and Leather Goods Industry
0605 Machine Construction Pulp, Wood, Leather and Textile
0701 Farming Facility
0702 Facility for Food Processing
0703 Products based on plant and animals
0704 Machine Construction in agricultural and food product sector
0801 Metal Industry
0802 Primary Products
0803 Synthetic Materials Industry
0804 Medical Technology - Research
0805 Electrical Engineering, Computing, Fine Mechanics, Optics
0806 Machine Construction for Manufacturing
0901 Environment Engineering Facilities
1001 Services
1002 Delivery Services
Notes: Euler Hermes deﬁnes sectors/industries according to an internal classiﬁcation which is based
on covered products. Besides this 4 digit classiﬁcation there exists a 6 digit nomenclature which we
use for the underlying dataset. Source: Euler Herms.
32Table A.2: Observed Sectors - NACE 1.1 Classiﬁcation -
NACE 1.1 sector
classiﬁcation Text Freq. Percent
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 1,672 2.57
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 1,167 1.8
5 Fishing, ﬁsh farming and related service activities 740 1.14
10 Manufacture of food products 1,004 1.55
11 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 260 0.4
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 19 0.03
13 Mining of metal ores 746 1.15
14 Other mining and quarrying 1,625 2.5
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 1,985 3.06
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1,300 2
17-18 Manufacture of textiles Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 2,062 3.17
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 1,899 2.92
saddlery, harness and footwear
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 1,763 2.71
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 1,952 3.01
22.1,22.2-22.3 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1,941 2.99
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 984 1.51
23.2 Manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1,717 2.64
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2,102 3.24
25.1 Manufacture of rubber products 1,971 3.03
25.2 Manufacture of plastic products 2,044 3.15
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2,003 3.08
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1,960 3.02
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 2,054 3.16
28.62 Manufacture of tools 1,993 3.07
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2,111 3.25
30 Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers 1,971 3.03
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 2,080 3.2
31.1 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 1,955 3.01
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 2,005 3.09
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 2,104 3.24
33.1 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 2,006 3.09
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2,120 3.26
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1,553 2.39
35.1 Building and repairing of ships and boats 1,153 1.78
35.2 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 1,246 1.92
35.3 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 1,496 2.3
35.5 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 1,267 1.95
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 2,071 3.19
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 234 0.36
74 Other business activities 1,115 1.72
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1,413 2.18
93 Other service activities 94 0.14
Total 64,957 100
Notes: Based on correspondence tables from eurostat (RAMON-Database) it is possible to trans-
form export data from HS-6 into a NACE 1.1 sectoral classiﬁcation. Euler Hermes’ internal classi-
ﬁcation of EZDs permits the allocation of export guarantees to the listed 42 sectors. Although our
data is restricted to manufacturing the transformation of our data based on oﬃcial correspondence
tables leads to some observations in the service sector (e.g. 74, 92, 93).
33Table A.3: Countries of Speciﬁc World Regions
Angola, Benin, Burkina faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Equatorial guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,Senegal,
Sierra leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
New EU Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegowina,
Eastern and Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian
Southern Europe federation, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Usbekistan
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Latin America Cuba, Dominica, Dominican republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland islands,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran (islamic republic of), Iraq,
Middle East Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Andorra, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France,
EU 15 Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, San marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
East Asia Cambodia, China, Hong kong, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Macau, Mongolia, Viet Nam
Rich East Asia Japan, Korea, Singapore
Other OECD Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, East Timor,
South Asia India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Seychelles, Sri lanka, Thailand
American Samoa, Anguilla, Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba,
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Bouvet Island, British Indian Ocean Territory,
Cayman Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Comoros, Cook Islands,
Fiji, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Grenada, Guam,
Heard and Mc Donald Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Islands Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue,
Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Pitcairn, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome
and Principe, Solomon Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich,
St. Helena, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, United States Minor Outlying Islands,
Vanuatu, Virgin Islands, Wallis and Futuna Islands
Notes: The region EU 15 includes Andorra, Gibraltar, Norway, Switzerland
34Table A.4: Summary Statistics
Large sample I (N=42,669), e.g. Table II
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
ln Exports 7.970 3.43 -0.34 16.94 BACI
Hermes (0,1) 0.034 0.18 0.00 1.00 Euler Hermes
ln Guarantees 0.520 2.81 0.00 21.46 Euler Hermes
Coverage ratio 0.004 0.04 0.00 0.96 Euler Hermes
ln GDP 24.363 2.09 19.59 30.07 WDI
ln Population 9.273 1.74 3.66 14.10 WDI
Custums Union (0,1) 0.179 0.38 0.00 1.00 WTO
Economic Integration Agreement (0,1) 0.262 0.44 0.00 1.00 WTO
ln nominal exchange rate 2.835 2.70 -3.01 10.08 WDI
OECD country risk 3.949 2.60 0.00 7.00 OECD
ln capital formation 22.824 2.10 17.68 28.43 WDI
ln manufacturing imports 4.191 0.20 2.58 4.53 WDI
Large sample II (N=64957), e.g. Table III
ln Exports 6.967 3.57 -0.34 16.945 BACI
Hermes (0,1) 0.025 0.16 0.00 1.000 Euler Hermes
ln Guarantees 0.379 2.40 0.00 21.459 Euler Hermes
Coverage ratio 0.003 0.04 0.00 0.962 Euler Hermes
Small sample (N=1,456), e.g. Table II
ln Exports 12.0 2.0 4.3 16.37 BACI
ln Guarantees 15.3 2.5 7.0 21.46 Euler Hermes
ln GDP 25.6 1.6 21.3 30.07 WDI
ln Population 10.4 1.5 6.0 14.10 WDI
Custums Union (0,1) 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.00 WTO
Economic Integration Agreement (0,1) 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.00 WTO
ln nominal exchange rate 2.7 2.7 -1.3 10.08 WDI
OECD country risk 3.8 2.1 0.0 7.00 OECD
ln capital formation 24.1 1.6 19.4 28.43 WDI
ln manufacturing imports 4.2 0.2 2.8 4.53 WDI
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). WDI denotes World Development












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table A.6: The Hermes eﬀect across years, 2000-2009
Dep.var. Ln exports, by sector.
(1) (2) (3)
Hermes variable
Year Dummy ln Guarantees Coverage
2000 0.239*** 0.020*** 1.126***
(0.058) (0.004) (0.267)
2001 0.207*** 0.016*** 0.415
(0.055) (0.004) (0.301)
2002 0.187** 0.015*** 0.725***
(0.058) (0.004) (0.210)
2003 0.218*** 0.016*** 0.830**
(0.057) (0.004) (0.253)
2004 0.136* 0.011** 0.393
(0.056) (0.004) (0.237)
2005 0.076 0.007 0.344
(0.067) (0.005) (0.365)
2006 0.110 0.009* 0.886
(0.069) (0.005) (0.464)
2007 0.100 0.008 0.421
(0.059) (0.004) (0.416)
2008 0.184** 0.013*** 0.939**
(0.057) (0.004) (0.300)
2009 0.062 0.006 0.175
(0.067) (0.004) (0.249)
Within R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.150
No. of observations 64,957 64,957 64,957
No. of markets 7,787 7,787 7,787
Notes: Panel dimension is country  sector (“export market”). Robust
standard errors corrected for clustering along the destination country 
sector dimension displayed in brackets. All regressions contain year  in-
dustry eﬀects and year  country eﬀects (not shown). Country  sector
eﬀects are eliminated by within transformation. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Chi2 Hausman test rejects random eﬀects speciﬁcation in each
model.
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